When is it Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs?Sandwiching the Better Safe than Sorry Argument

Author: Stephens C.L.1

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 105, Number 2, August 2001 , pp. 161-189(29)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Several philosophers have argued that natural selection will favor reliable belief formation; others have been more skeptical. These traditional approaches to the evolution of rationality have been either too sketchy or else have assumed that phenotypic plasticity can be equated with having a mind. Here I develop a new model to explore the functional utility of belief and desire formation mechanisms, and defend the claim that natural selection favors reliable inference methods in a broad, but not universal, range of circumstances.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, 455 W. Lindsey, Room 605, Norman, OK 73019, USA E-mail: cstephens@ou.edu

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