Reasoning and Representing

Author: Kalderon M.E.1

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 105, Number 2, August 2001 , pp. 129-160(32)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

I argue that logical understanding is not propositional knowledge but is rather a species of practical knowledge. I further argue that given the best explanation of logical understanding some version or another of inferential role semantics must be the correct account of the determinants of logical content.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK E-mail: m.kalderon@ucl.ac.uk

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