The Cardinality Objection to David Lewis's Modal Realism

Author: Pruss A.R.

Source: Philosophical Studies, Volume 104, Number 2, May 2001 , pp. 169-178(10)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every way that a world could be is a way that some concretely existing physical world really is. But if the worlds are physical entities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereas I show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is not a set. The latter conclusion remains true even outside of the Lewisian framework.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, U.S.A. E-mail: pruss@member.ams.org

Publication date: 2001-05-01