Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology
Author: Zahavi, Dan
Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 6, Numbers 1-2, March 2007 , pp. 21-43(23)
Abstract:Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Publication date: March 2007