How can you be surprised? The case for volatile expectations

Authors: Casati, Roberto¹; Pasquinelli, Elena

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 6, Numbers 1-2, March 2007 , pp. 171-183(13)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Surprise has been characterized has an emotional reaction to an upset belief having a heuristic role and playing a criterial role for belief ascription. The discussion of cases of diachronic and synchronic violations of coherence suggests that surprise plays an epistemic role and provides subjects with some sort of phenomenological access to their subpersonal doxastic states. Lack of surprise seems not to have the same epistemic power. A distinction between belief and expectation is introduced in order to account for some aspects of surprise: expectations are construed as volatile representations that tie belief to action. In the cases in which action is not involved, general, “ideological,” expectations are generate in strict connection with the context and with the possibilities of action.

Keywords: surprise; belief; expectation; coherence; action; volatile representation

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9028-9

Affiliations: 1: Email: casati@ehess.fr

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