Dennett on seeming

Author: Carman, Taylor

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 6, Numbers 1-2, March 2007 , pp. 99-106(8)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Dennett's eliminativist theory of consciousness rests on an implausible reduction of sensory seeming to cognitive judgment. The “heterophenomenological” testimony to which he appeals in urging that reduction poses no threat to phenomenology, but merely demonstrates the conceptual indeterminacy of small-scale sensory appearances. Phenomenological description is difficult, but the difficulty does not warrant Dennett's neo-Cartesian claim that there is no such thing as seeming at all as distinct from judging.

Keywords: phenomenology; Dennett; heterophenomenology

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9026-y

Affiliations: 1: Email: tcarman@barnard.edu

Publication date: 2007-03-01