Reflexive monism versus complementarism: An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans's reflexive model of consciousness

Author: Hoche, Hans-Ulrich¹

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 6, Number 3, July 2007 , pp. 389-409(21)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic `phenomenon' in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans's reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans's ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation.

Keywords: mind-body problem; complementarity; dual-aspect theory; psychophysical causation; pure noematics; reflexive monism; Velmans

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9045-8

Affiliations: 1: Email: huhoche@cityweb.de

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