Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads

Author: Hutto, Daniel

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 5, Number 1, March 2006 , pp. 75-88(14)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Much of the difficulty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advocates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon (or data) they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions are philosophically innocent. In what follows, I will attempt to reveal, using a recent debate between Chalmers and Dennett as a foil, why, in approaching this topic, we cannot characterise the data purely first-personally or third-personally nor, concomitantly, can we start such investigations using either first-personal or third-personal methods.

Keywords: consciousness; first-person experience; hard problem; heterophenomenology; intersubjectivity

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9013-8

Affiliations: Email: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk

Publication date: March 1, 2006

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