Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of `corporality' and `alerting capacity'

Authors: O'regan, J.1; Myin, Erik2; NOë, Alva3

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 4, Number 4, December 2005 , pp. 369-387(19)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do.

Keywords: qualia; consciousness; sensorimotor; skill; sensation; action

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-005-9000-0

Affiliations: 1: Email: oregan@ext.jussieu.fr 2: Email: Erik.Myin@ua.ac.be 3: Email: noe@socrates.berkeley.edu

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