@article {Oregan:December 2005:1568-7759:369,
	author = "Oregan, J.",
	author = "Myin, Erik",
	author = "NOe, Alva",
	title = "Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of corporality and alerting capacity",
	journal = "Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences",
	volume = "4",
	year = "December 2005",
	abstract = "How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do.",
	pages = "369-387(19)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2005/00000004/00000004/00009000"
	doi = "doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9000-0"
}