Resisting ruthless reductionism: A comment on Bickle

Authors: Bayne, Tim¹; FernÁndez, Jordi²

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 4, Number 3, December 2005 , pp. 239-248(10)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Philosophy and Neuroscienceis an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in the philosophy of mind. Although we have learnt much from Bickle's work, we find his central claims unconvincing. Our comments have two central foci:Bickle's account of mental causation, and his single-cell account of consciousness. We argue that Bickle's attempt to solve the problem of mental causation is marred by his refusal to take multiple realizability seriously, and we suggest that his faith in single cell accounts of consciousness is misplaced. We remain unconvinced that the solutions to the problems of mental causation and consciousness are to be found in neuroscience.

Keywords: psycho-physical identity; mental causation; consciousness; externalism; internalism

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4073-3

Affiliations: 1: Email: tbayne@scmp.mq.edu.au 2: Email: jfernandez@scmp.mq.edu.au

Publication date: 2005-12-01