The mind reduced to molecules?
Author: Gottschling, Verena
Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 4, Number 3, December 2005 , pp. 279-283(5)
Publisher: Springer
Abstract:
According to Bickle, certain empirical results demonstrate that the bottom-up reduction of phychological concepts to the concepts of neuroscience has already been accomplished. I argue that this conclusion is hasty. Bickle claims that all high-level investigations depend on a mistake. I argue that this overstates the explanatory character of neuroscientific findings. Bickle's assessment is highly optimistic, but he is far from making a decisive argument. Those who wait for a full-blown reductionism will have to wait a little longer.Keywords: reductionism; bottom-up vs top-down; molecular and cellular neuroscience
Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4071-5
Affiliations: 1: Email: gottschl@uni-mainz.de
Publication date: 2005-12-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Gottschling, Verena

Shopping cart
Receive new issue alert