The mind reduced to molecules?

Author: Gottschling, Verena1

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 4, Number 3, December 2005 , pp. 279-283(5)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

According to Bickle, certain empirical results demonstrate that the bottom-up reduction of phychological concepts to the concepts of neuroscience has already been accomplished. I argue that this conclusion is hasty. Bickle claims that all high-level investigations depend on a mistake. I argue that this overstates the explanatory character of neuroscientific findings. Bickle's assessment is highly optimistic, but he is far from making a decisive argument. Those who wait for a full-blown reductionism will have to wait a little longer.

Keywords: reductionism; bottom-up vs top-down; molecular and cellular neuroscience

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-005-4071-5

Affiliations: 1: Email: gottschl@uni-mainz.de

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