Is the brain a memory box?

Author: Jacobson, Anne¹

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 4, Number 3, December 2005 , pp. 271-278(8)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.

Keywords: memory; reductionism; normative explanation; content; intentionality

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-005-4069-z

Affiliations: 1: Email: ajjacobson@uh.edu

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