The co-consciousness hypothesis

Author: Frédérique de Vignemont1

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 3, Number 1, 2004 , pp. 97-114(18)

Publisher: Springer

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:

Self-knowledge seems to be radically different from the knowledge of other people. However, rather than focusing on the gap between self and others, we should emphasize their commonality. Indeed, different “mirror matching mechanisms” have been found in monkeys as well as in humans showing that one uses the same representations for oneself and for the others. But do these shared representations allow one to report the mental states of others as if they were one's own? I intend in this essay to address the epistemic problem of other minds by developing Ayer's notion of co-consciousness.

Keywords: Ayer; co-consciousness; empathy; mirror neurons; theory of mind

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1023/B:PHEN.0000041894.48541.1c

Affiliations: 1: Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, UK ., Email: f.vignemont@ucl.ac.uk

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$47.00 plus tax

 

OR

Back to top

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content
Page Help Click here for Page Help
Shopping cart
Tools
Sign in






Need to register?
Sign up here
Text size: A | A | A | A