An adverbial theory of consciousness

Author: Thomas A.¹

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Volume 2, Number 3, 2003 , pp. 161-185(25)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Thomas Nagel's criterion for an acceptable theory of conscious awareness, that it address the question of “what it is like” to be a conscious subject has been misunderstood in the light of an implicit act/object model of conscious awareness. Kant's account of conscious experience is an adverbial theory precisely in the sense that it avoids such an act/object interpretation. An “objectualist” and an “actualist” construal of views of conscious awareness are contrasted. The idea of an adverbial theory of conscious experience is further developed by examining recent re-interpretations of Brentano as an adverbial theorist (Thomasson) or as an identity theorist (Hossack). Identity theory is independently criticized as a free standing account of consciousness. Kant's adverbial view is further developed and extended to an account of self-ascription and self-knowledge.

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NF, Email: a.p.thomas@kent.ac.uk

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