Abstract:

If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue, and given computationalism, this has implications for what it is to implement a computation. I then consider what happens when a computation is implemented in a system that either uses unreliable components or possesses varying degrees of parallelism. I show that in some of these cases there can be, in a deep and intriguing sense, a fractional (non-integer) number of qualitatively identical phenomenal experiences. This, in turn, has implications for what lessons one should draw from neural replacement scenarios such as Chalmers' “Fading Qualia” thought experiment.

Keywords: Computation; Mind; Consciousness; Implementation; Duplication; Fading qualia; Chalmers; Searle; Program; Probabilistic; Deterministic

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11023-006-9036-0

Affiliations: 1: Email: nick.bostrom@philosophy.ox.ac.uk