On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity

Author: Collins, J.¹

Source: Minds and Machines, Volume 15, Number 1, February 2005 , pp. 1-22(22)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Jerry Fodor argues that the massive modularity thesis – the claim that (human) cognition is wholly served by domain specific, autonomous computational devices, i.e., modules – is a priori incoherent, self-defeating. The thesis suffers from what Fodor dubs the ‘input problem’: the function of a given module (proprietarily understood) in a wholly modular system presupposes non-modular processes. It will be argued that massive modularity suffers from no such a priori problem. Fodor, however, also offers what he describes as a ‘really real’ input problem (i.e., an empirical one). It will be suggested that this problem is real enough, but it does not selectively strike down massive modularity – it is a problem for everyone.

Keywords: Fodor; input problem; language faculty; massive modularity; Sperber; theory of mind

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11023-004-1346-5

Affiliations: 1: School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, NR4 7TJ, Email: john.collins@uea.ac.uk

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