On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity
Author: Collins, J.1
Source: Minds and Machines, Volume 15, Number 1, February 2005 , pp. 1-22(22)
Publisher: Springer
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Abstract:
Jerry Fodor argues that the massive modularity thesis the claim that (human) cognition is wholly served by domain specific, autonomous computational devices, i.e., modules is a priori incoherent, self-defeating. The thesis suffers from what Fodor dubs the input problem: the function of a given module (proprietarily understood) in a wholly modular system presupposes non-modular processes. It will be argued that massive modularity suffers from no such a priori problem. Fodor, however, also offers what he describes as a really real input problem (i.e., an empirical one). It will be suggested that this problem is real enough, but it does not selectively strike down massive modularity it is a problem for everyone.Keywords: Fodor; input problem; language faculty; massive modularity; Sperber; theory of mind
Document Type: Research article
DOI: 10.1007/s11023-004-1346-5
Affiliations: 1: School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, NR4 7TJ, Email: john.collins@uea.ac.uk
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