The Self as an Embedded Agent

Authors: Dobbyn C.¹; Stuart S.²

Source: Minds and Machines, Volume 13, Number 2, May 2003 , pp. 187-201(15)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, proposing a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment, and examine the claim that internal representational schemas are largely unnecessary for intelligent behaviour in animats. We maintain that current situated and embodied animats cannot be ascribed even minimal self-awareness, and offer a six point definition of embeddedness, constituting minimal conditions for the evolution of a sense of self. This leads to further analysis of the nature of embodiment and situatedness, and a consideration of whether virtual animats in virtual worlds could count as situated and embodied. We propose that self-aware agents must possess complex structures of self-directed goals; multi-modal sensory systems and a rich repertoire of interactions with their worlds. Finally, we argue that embedded agents will possess or evolve local co-ordinate systems, or points of view, relative to their current positions in space and time, and have a capacity to develop an egocentric space. None of these capabilities are possible without powerful internal representational capacities.

Keywords: agent; embedded; embodied; representation; situated

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Computing, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK; E-mail: c.h.dobbyn@open.ac.uk 2: Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK; E-mail: S.Stuart@philosophy.arts.gla.ac. uk

Publication date: 2003-05-01