Machine Mentality and the Nature of the Ground Relation

Author: Whobrey D.¹

Source: Minds and Machines, Volume 11, Number 3, August 2001 , pp. 307-346(40)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

John Searle distinguished between weak and strong artificial intelligence (AI). This essay discusses a third alternative, mild AI, according to which a machine may be capable of possessing a species of mentality. Using James Fetzer's conception of minds as semiotic systems, the possibility of what might be called ``mild AI'' receives consideration. Fetzer argues against strong AI by contending that digital machines lack the ground relationship required of semiotic systems. In this essay, the implementational nature of semiotic processes posited by Charles S. Peirce's triadic sign relation is re-examined in terms of the underlying dispositional processes and the ontological levels they would span in an inanimate machine. This suggests that, if non-human mentality can be replicated rather than merely simulated in a digital machine, the direction to pursue appears to be that of mild AI.

Keywords: artificial intelligence; causal systems; dispositional processes; emergence; ground relation; machine mentality; mind; numeric systems; ontological levels; replication; semiotic processes; simulation; symbolic systems