Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science?

Author: Knowles J.

Source: Minds and Machines, Volume 11, Number 3, August 2001 , pp. 347-377(31)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments for the idea that intentional psychological states, such as beliefs, must be seen as requiring in-the-head mental representations for us to be able to understand their characteristic causal powers and argue that none of them validly generate their desired conclusions. I go on to argue that RTM, or some computational version thereof, is not motivated by appeal to the nature of cognitive science research either. I conclude that intentional psychology, though an empirical theory, is autonomous from details of lower level mechanism in a way that renders RTM unwarranted.

Keywords: abstract propositions; broad content; cognitive science; connectionism; folk psychology; intentional psychology; language of thought; levels of explanation; modes of presentation; naturalisation; physicalism; representational theory of mind

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Philosophy Department, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 7491 Trondheim, Norway; E-mail: jonathan.knowles@hf.ntnu.no

Publication date: 2001-08-01