In Computation, Parallel is Nothing, Physical Everything
Author: Bringsjord, S.
Source: Minds and Machines, Volume 11, Number 1, February 2001 , pp. 95-99(5)
Abstract:Andrew Boucher (1997) argues that ``parallel computation is fundamentally different from sequential computation'' (p. 543), and that this fact provides reason to be skeptical about whether AI can produce a genuinely intelligent machine. But parallelism, as I prove herein, is irrelevant. What Boucher has inadvertently glimpsed is one small part of a mathematical tapestry portraying the simple but undeniable fact that physical computation can be fundamentally different from ordinary, ``textbook'' computation (whether parallel or sequential). This tapestry does indeed immediately imply that human cognition may be uncomputable.
Document Type: Regular Paper
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science, Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), Troy, NY 12180-3590, USA; E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org www.rpi.edu/∼brings
Publication date: 2001-02-01