In Computation, Parallel is Nothing, Physical Everything

Author: Bringsjord S.

Source: Minds and Machines, Volume 11, Number 1, February 2001 , pp. 95-99(5)

Publisher: Springer

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $47.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Andrew Boucher (1997) argues that ``parallel computation is fundamentally different from sequential computation'' (p. 543), and that this fact provides reason to be skeptical about whether AI can produce a genuinely intelligent machine. But parallelism, as I prove herein, is irrelevant. What Boucher has inadvertently glimpsed is one small part of a mathematical tapestry portraying the simple but undeniable fact that physical computation can be fundamentally different from ordinary, ``textbook'' computation (whether parallel or sequential). This tapestry does indeed immediately imply that human cognition may be uncomputable.

Keywords: artificial intelligence; parallel computation; simulation proofs; Turing machines; uncomputable functions

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science, Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), Troy, NY 12180-3590, USA; E-mail: selmer@rpi.edu www.rpi.edu/ sim bringsbrings">