IngentaConnect Meaning, Dispositions and Normativity

Author: Toribio J.¹

Source: Minds and Machines, Volume 9, Number 3, August 1999 , pp. 399-413(15)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

In a recent paper, Paul Coates defends a sophisticated dispositional account which allegedly resolves the sceptical paradox developed by Kripke in his monograph on Wittgenstein's treatment of following a rule (Kripke, 1982). Coates' account appeals to a notion of `homeostasis', unpacked as a subject's second-order disposition to maintain a consistent pattern of extended first-order dispositions regarding her linguistic behavior. This kind of account, Coates contends, provides a naturalistic model for the normativity of intentional properties and thus resolves Kripke's sceptical paradox.

In this paper I argue that Coates' second-order dispositional account cannot solve the sceptic's problems regarding meaning and normativity. My main contention is that in order for second-order dispositions to be able to effectively regulate the coordinated responses constitutive of first-order dispositions, those first order dispositions must be independently identifiable. Yet that's precisely what Kripke's sceptical argument calls into question. I shall also argue, in a more positive fashion, that Coates' own appeal to practical breakdowns may suggest a different – and more effective – response to the sceptic's concern.

Keywords: dispositions; mistake; normativity; sceptical paradox

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Phibsophy, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1073, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO, 63130, U.S.A. (E-mail: pepa@twinearth.wustl.edu)

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