IngentaConnect The Trouble with Two-Factor Conceptual Role Theories

Abstract:

Two-Factor conceptual role theories of mental content are often intended to allow mental representations to satisfy two competing requirements. One is the Fregean requirement that two representations, like public language expressions, can have different meanings even though they have the same reference (as in the case of `morning star' and `evening star'). The other is Putnam's Twin-earth requirement that two representations or expressions can have the same conceptual role but differ in meaning due to differing references. But I argue that the hidden agenda behind these theories is to make misrepresentation possible. A simple, one-factor conceptual role theory (like the "crude causal theory" Fodor describes) falls prey to the disjunction problem. If every use or application of a concept is meaning-determining, then there can be no misuse of that concept. Each use will partially determine its meaning, and, use which is covered in the meaning cannot be a misuse, error, or misrepresentation. I argue that the referential factor in two-factor conceptual role theories is what is supposed to make misrepresentation possible. But it fails to do so, because when the two factors do not determine the same meaning, there is no non-question-begging way to have one of them take precedence and force meaning to align with one factor and deviate from the other.

Keywords: mental content; mental representation; conceptual role; reference; concept; concept application; misrepresentation; Twin-earth; dual aspect semantics; disjunction problem; analytic/synthetic distinction; Block; Harman

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Arizona State University, Box 872004, Tempe, AZ 85287-2004, U.S.A. (e-mail: perlman@asu.edu)

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