Bayes and health care research

Author: Allmark, Peter1

Source: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Volume 7, Number 3, January 2004 , pp. 321-332(12)

Publisher: Springer

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:

Bayes’ rule shows how one might rationally change one’s beliefs in the light of evidence. It is the foundation of a statistical method called Bayesianism. In health care research, Bayesianism has its advocates but the dominant statistical method is frequentism. There are at least two important philosophical differences between these methods. First, Bayesianism takes a subjectivist view of probability (i.e. that probability scores are statements of subjective belief, not objective fact) whilst frequentism takes an objectivist view. Second, Bayesianism is explicitly inductive (i.e. it shows how we may induce views about the world based on partial data from it) whereas frequentism is at least compatible with non-inductive views of scientific method, particularly the critical realism of Popper. Popper and others detail significant problems with induction. Frequentism’s apparent ability to avoid these, plus its ability to give a seemingly more scientific and objective take on probability, lies behind its philosophical appeal to health care researchers. However, there are also significant problems with frequentism, particularly its inability to assign probability scores to single events. Popper thus proposed an alternative objectivist view of probability, called propensity theory, which he allies to a theory of corroboration; but this too has significant problems, in particular, it may not successfully avoid induction. If this is so then Bayesianism might be philosophically the strongest of the statistical approaches. The article sets out a number of its philosophical and methodological attractions. Finally, it outlines a way in which critical realism and Bayesianism might work together.

Keywords: Bayes; Bayesianism; critical realism; frequentism; health care; induction; Popper; research; statistics

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11019-004-0804-4

Affiliations: 1: Department of Acute and Critical Care Nursing, 011011011011011011011011University of Sheffield, Sheffield, 011011011011011011011011011UK, Email: p.j.allmark@shef.ac.uk

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$47.00 plus tax

 

OR

Back to top

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content
Page Help Click here for Page Help
Shopping cart
Tools
Sign in






Need to register?
Sign up here
Text size: A | A | A | A