The Irreducibility of Personal Obligation
Author: Ross, Jacob
Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Volume 39, Number 3, June 2010 , pp. 307-323(17)
Abstract:It is argued that claims about personal obligation (of the form “s ought to Φ”) cannot be reduced to claims about impersonal obligation (of the form “it ought to be the case that p”). The most common attempts at such a reduction are shown to have unacceptable implications in cases involving a plurality of agents. It is then argued that similar problems will face any attempt to reduce personal obligation to impersonal obligation.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: School of Philosophy, University of Southern California, 3709 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA, 90029, USA, Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Publication date: June 2010