Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation

Authors: Pauly, Marc¹; Hees, Martin²

Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Volume 35, Number 6, December 2006 , pp. 569-585(17)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s10992-005-9011-x

Affiliations: 1: Email: Marc.Pauly@stanford.edu 2: Email: Martin.van.Hees@rug.nl

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