Quine and Slater on Paraconsistency and Deviance

Author: Paoli, F.

Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Volume 32, Number 5, October 2003 , pp. 531-548(18)

Publisher: Springer

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In a famous and controversial paper, B. H. Slater has argued against the possibility of paraconsistent logics. Our reply is centred on the distinction between two aspects of the meaning of a logical constant *c* in a given logic: its operational meaning, given by the operational rules for *c* in a cut-free sequent calculus for the logic at issue, and its global meaning, specified by the sequents containing *c* which can be proved in the same calculus. Subsequently, we use the same strategy to counter Quine's meaning variance argument against deviant logics. In a nutshell, we claim that genuine rivalry between (similar) logics *L* and *L′* is possible whenever each constant in *L* has the same operational meaning as its counterpart in *L′* although differences in global meaning arise in at least one case.

Keywords: Quine; deviant logics; logical pluralism; paraconsistent logics; proof-theoretic semantics; substructural logics

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Dipartimento di Scienze Pedagogiche e Filosofiche Università di Cagliari Via Is Mirrionis 1, 09123 Cagliari, Italy e-mail: paoli@unica.it

Publication date: October 1, 2003

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