The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment III Brandomian Scorekeeping and Incompatibility

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In this Subject: <a title="Philosophy" href="/content/subcat;jsessionid=tfkolfnpihd2.alice?j_subject=223&j_availability=">Philosophy
By this author: Lance M.

Author: Lance M.

Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Volume 30, Number 5, October 2001 , pp. 439-464(26)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Curiously, though he provides in Making It Explicit (MIE) elaborate accounts of various representational idioms, of anaphora and deixis, and of quantification, Robert Brandom nowhere attempts to lay out how his understanding of content and his view of the role of logical idioms combine in even the simplest cases of what he calls paradigmatic logical vocabulary. That is, Brandom has a philosophical account of content as updating potential – as inferential potential understood in the sense of commitment or entitlement preservation – and says that the point of logical vocabulary is to make available the expressive resources to make explicit such semantic structures as arise from discursive scorekeeping practice. Thus, one would expect an account of the updating or inferential potential of sentences involving logical vocabulary, an account which is such as to assign to those sentences the inferential significance necessary for this expressive job. In short, one would expect a semantics of logical vocabulary – &, , sim rarr – in terms of the difference an assertion of a sentence involving it makes to the atomic score of a linguistic agent, and a completeness proof for the logic generated by this semantics. Despite this, no such semantics is given in MIE. It is in the current paper.