Truth as Translation – Part B
Author: Leitgeb, H.
Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Volume 30, Number 4, August 2001 , pp. 309-328(20)
Abstract:This is the second part of a paper dealing with truth and translation. In Part A a revised version of Tarski's Convention T has been presented, which explicitly refers to a translation mapping from the object language to the metalanguage; the vague notion of a translation has been replaced by a precise definition. At the end of Part A it has been shown that interpreted languages exist, which allow for vicious self-reference but which nevertheless contain their own truth predicate – this is possible if truth is based on a nonstandard translation mapping. However, this result has only been proved for languages without quantifiers. In Part B we now extend the result to first-order languages, and we show that this can be done in three different ways. In each case, the addition of a truth predicate to an interpreted language with a high degree of expressiveness leads to changes in the ontology of the language.
Document Type: Regular Paper
Affiliations: Dept. of Philosophy University of Salzburg Austria (e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org)
Publication date: August 1, 2001