The Definability of the Set of Natural Numbers in the 1925 Principia Mathematica
Author: Landini, G.
Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Volume 25, Number 6, December 1996 , pp. 597-615(19)
Abstract:In his new introduction to the 1925 second edition of Principia Mathematica, Russell maintained that by adopting Wittgenstein’s idea that a logically perfect language should be extensional mathematical induction could be rectified for finite cardinals without the axiom of reducibility. In an Appendix B, Russell set forth a proof. Gödel caught a defect in the proof at \ast89.16, so that the matter of rectification remained open. Myhill later arrived at a negative result: Principia with extensionality principles and without reducibility cannot recover mathematical induction. The finite cardinals are indefinable in it. This paper shows that while Gödel and Myhill are correct, Russell was not wrong. The 1925 system employs a different grammar than the original Principia. A new proof for \ast89.16 is given and induction is recovered.
Document Type: Regular Paper
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, 269 English Philosophy Building, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1408, U.S.A.
Publication date: December 1, 1996