Moral Motivation Pluralism
Author: Francén, Ragnar
Source: The Journal of Ethics, Volume 14, Number 2, June 2010 , pp. 117-148(32)
Abstract:Motivational externalists and internalists of various sorts disagree about the circumstances under which it is conceptually possible to have moral opinions but lack moral motivation. Typically, the evidence referred to are intuitions about whether people in certain scenarios who lack moral motivation count as having moral opinions. People’s intuitions about such scenarios diverge, however. I argue that the nature of this diversity is such that, for each of the internalist and externalist theses, there is a strong prima facie reason to reject it. That much might not be very controversial. But I argue further, that it also gives us a strong prima facie reason to reject all of these theses. This is possible since there is an overlooked alternative option to accepting any of them: moral motivation pluralism, the view that different internalist and externalist theses correctly accounts for different people’s concepts of moral opinions, respectively. I end the paper with a discussion of methodological issues relevant to the argument for moral motivation pluralism and of the consequences of this view for theories about the nature of moral opinions, such as cognitivism and non-cognitivism.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Box 200, 405 30, Gothenburg, Sweden, Email: email@example.com
Publication date: June 2010