Vice and Reason

Author: Irwin T.

Source: The Journal of Ethics, Volume 5, Number 1, 2001 , pp. 73-97(25)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Aristotle's account of vice presents a puzzle: (1) Vicious people must be guided by reason, since they act on decision (prohairesis), not on their non-rational desires. (2) And yet they cannot be guided by reason, since they are said to pay attention to their non-rational part and not to live in accordance with reason. We can understand the conception of vice the reconciles these two claims, once we examine Aristotle's account of (a) the pursuit of the fine and of the expedient; (b) the connexion between vice and the pursuit of pleasure; (c) the particular kind of regret to which the vicious person is subject.

Keywords: Aristotle; character; decision (prohairesis); ethics; fine; pleasure; reason; regret; self-love; vice

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3201, USA, E-mail: thi1@cornell.edu

Publication date: 2001-01-01

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