Vice and Reason
Author: Irwin T.
Source: The Journal of Ethics, Volume 5, Number 1, 2001 , pp. 73-97(25)
Publisher: Springer
Abstract:
Aristotle's account of vice presents a puzzle: (1) Vicious people must be guided by reason, since they act on decision (prohairesis), not on their non-rational desires. (2) And yet they cannot be guided by reason, since they are said to pay attention to their non-rational part and not to live in accordance with reason. We can understand the conception of vice the reconciles these two claims, once we examine Aristotle's account of (a) the pursuit of the fine and of the expedient; (b) the connexion between vice and the pursuit of pleasure; (c) the particular kind of regret to which the vicious person is subject.
Keywords: Aristotle; character; decision (prohairesis); ethics; fine; pleasure; reason; regret; self-love; vice
Language: English
Document Type: Regular paper
Affiliations: 1: Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3201, USA, E-mail: thi1@cornell.edu
Publication date: 2001-01-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Irwin T.

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