Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason

Author: Lillehammer H.

Source: The Journal of Ethics, Volume 4, Number 3, July 2000 , pp. 173-190(18)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributions of normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a response independent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding a satisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modest terms.

Keywords: practical reason; normative reasons; response dependence; dispositionalism; normative realism; metaphysical revision

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: The University of Reading, Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AA UK E-mail: hl201@cam.ac.uk

Publication date: 2000-07-01

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