What is Science? Methodological Pitfalls Underlying the Empirical Exploration of Scientific Knowledge

Author: Yaneva, Dominika

Source: Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Volume 37, Number 2, October 2006 , pp. 333-353(21)

Publisher: Springer

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $47.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

The validity of three premises, set as foundational pillars of modern sociological approach to science, is contested, namely: (i) the postulate, stating that science is devoid of whatever generis specifical; (ii) it is liable to the usual empirical study; (iii) the practicing scientist's self-reflexive judgements must be disbelieved and rejected. Contrariwise, the ignored so far quaint nature of knowledge, escaping even from the elementary empirical treating - discernment and observation - is revealed and demonstrated. This peculiar nature requires, accordingly, a specific meta-cognitive dealing for positing it as `empirical object', unfortunately missed still by the Strong Programme. The inadequate approach adopted led to a substitution of `scientific' for common knowledge. The tacit thus far alternative, setting the foundations of meta-science, is suggested.

Keywords: nature of science; meta-cognitive proceeding; non-observability of knowledge

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-9013-6

Affiliations: 1: Email: dominika_yaneva@yahoo.com

Publication date: 2006-10-01