Normativity in Quine's Naturalism: The Technology of Truth-Seeking?
Author: Houkes, W.
Source: Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Volume 33, Number 2, 2002 , pp. 251-267(17)
In this paper, I review Quine's response to the normativity charge against naturalized epistemology. On this charge, Quine's naturalized epistemology neglects the essential normativity of the traditional theory of knowledge and hence cannot count as its successor. According to Quine, normativity is retained in naturalism as `the technology of truth-seeking'. I first disambiguate Quine's naturalism into three programs of increasing strength and clarify the strongest program by means of the so-called Epistemic Skinner Box. Then, I investigate two ways in which the appeal to technology as normative enterprise can be made good. I argue that neither coheres with other aspects of Quine's philosophy, most notably the elimination of intentionality. Finally, I briefly consider a third reconstruction of the response, which involves an extension of the web of ``belief'' to practical know-how. I conclude that the normativity of Quine's (strong) naturalism cannot be found in the technology of truth-seeking.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Eindhoven University of Technology, Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands (email@example.com)
Publication date: January 1, 2002