Public inputs and the credit market

Author: Kamath, Rajalaxmi

Source: International Tax and Public Finance, Volume 13, Number 6, November 2006 , pp. 733-753(21)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

This paper studies the impact of public goods provision in an adverse selection environment. Public inputs used collectively by firms have indirect spillovers in imperfect credit markets by affecting the random returns of borrowers in this market. Public inputs change the nature of the binding incentive constraint and mitigate distortions in the credit market. The magnitude of such indirect benefits depends upon the `type' of the public input being considered. Public inputs targeted to benefit the less-efficient borrowers in the economy have greater indirect benefits as compared to pure public inputs that benefit all. These additional efficiency gains, emerging out of information-asymmetries in the credit market, should be considered in the cost-benefit analysis of such public inputs.

Keywords: Public inputs; Incentive-constraint; Credit-market; Modified Samuelson rule

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-006-6742-8

Affiliations: 1: Email: rajlaxmi@igidr.ac.in

Publication date: 2006-11-01