Not All Threats are Created Equal: How Implicitness and Timing Affect the Effectiveness of Threats in Negotiations

Authors: Sinaceur, Marwan¹; Neale, Margaret²

Source: Group Decision and Negotiation, Volume 14, Number 1, January 2005 , pp. 63-85(23)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The effectiveness of threats in negotiations was examined by exploring two factors likely to affect it: implicitness, or the extent to which the threat mentions what action the perpetrator would take if the target does not comply; and timing, or the time when the threat is stated. Participants were given a negotiation scenario that differed only by the nature of the threat made by their counterpart. The design was a 2 (implicit vs. explicit threat) × 2 (early vs. late threat) factorial design with a control condition (no threat). The study showed that early-implicit and late-explicit threats were both more likely to elicit concessions than early-explicit and late-implicit threats. The two more effective threats were also the ones that made the perpetrator seem less aggressive. Further, perceived credibility mediated the positive effect that late-explicit threats had over late-implicit threats in eliciting concessions. These results support the claim that whether making the threat’s sanction implicit is effective depends on its timing, as the nature of bargaining moves and perceptions varies over time (Pruitt 1981). They suggest that the way in which a threat is stated may dramatically influence its effect on the target.

Keywords: communication; distributiveness; language; negotiation; threats; time

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-005-3876-5

Affiliations: 1: Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA, 94305, USA, Email: sinaceur@stanford.edu 2: Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA, 94305, USA,

Publication date: 2005-01-01