How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

Authors: Charness G.¹; Frechette G.R.²; Kagel J.H.³

Source: Experimental Economics, Volume 7, Number 2, June 2004 , pp. 189-205(17)

Publisher: Springer

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $47.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change—whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.

Keywords: gift exchange; robustness; framing

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026979.14590.3c

Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, UCSB, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210, USA 2: Harvard Business School, Boston MA 02163, USA 3: Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA., Email: kagel.4@osu.edu

Publication date: 2004-06-01