An Application of the English Clock Market Mechanism to Public Goods Games

Authors: Levati M.V.1; Neugebauer T.2

Source: Experimental Economics, Volume 7, Number 2, June 2004 , pp. 153-169(17)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

This paper reports an experimental study of the public goods game in which contributions are not submitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. Individuals press a button as soon as the clock equals their willingness to contribute. By providing information about the point at which subjects stop further contributions we find evidence for conditionally cooperative behaviour: A subject's decision to stop contributing induces an immediate reaction of the other group members.

Keywords: real time public goods; voluntary contributions; conditional cooperation

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026977.32722.f1

Affiliations: 1: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany., Email: levati@mpiew-jena.mpg.de 2: Finanzmarkttheorie, Universität Hannover, Königsworther Platz 1, D-30167 Hannover, Germany., Email: T.Neugebauer@mbox.vwl.uni-hannover.de

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