IngentaConnect Repetition, Communication, and Coordination Failure

Authors: Parkhurst G.M.¹; Shogren J.F.²; Bastian C.³

Source: Experimental Economics, Volume 7, Number 2, June 2004 , pp. 141-152(12)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

We examine repetition as an institution that affects coordination failure in a game with and without pre-play communication. We use probit regression with random effects to test hypotheses regarding the frequency and form of coordination failure in the presence of repeated play versus one-shot games. Our results indicate that repetition without pre-play communication results in a lower frequency of coordination failure relative to one-shot game outcomes. This result is reversed when pre-play communication is allowed. Our evidence also suggests that repeated play coordination failures tend to be suboptimal Nash equilibria, whereas one-shot game coordination failures are disequilibria regardless of the presence of pre-play communication.

Keywords: coordination failure; communication; repetition; coordination games

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026976.44467.66

Affiliations: 1: Department of Agricultural Economics, Mississipi State University, Mississippi State, MS, 39762-5187, USA., Email: parkhurst@agecon.msstate.edu 2: Department of Economics, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, 82071-3985, USA 3: Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 80271-3354, USA

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