Confidence in unwarranted knowledge

Author: Martens, David B.

Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 65, Number 2, September 2006 , pp. 143-164(22)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Epistemic minimalism affirms that mere true belief is sufficient for propositional knowledge. I construct a taxonomy of some specific forms of minimalism and locate within that taxonomy the distinct positions of various advocates of minimalism, including Alvin Goldman, Jaakko Hintikka, Crispin Sartwell, Wolfgang Lenzen, Franz von Kutschera, and others. I weigh generic minimalism against William Lycan's objection that minimalism is incompatible with plausible principles about relations between knowledge, belief, and confidence. I argue that Lycan's objection fails for equivocation but that some specific forms of minimalism are better able than others to articulate that defense.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9007-0

Affiliations: 1: Email: martensd@social.wits.ac.za

Publication date: 2006-09-01

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