Author: Jaworski, William

Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 65, Number 2, September 2006 , pp. 277-299(23)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

Dual-attribute theories are alleged to face a problem with mental causation which commits them to either epiphenomenalism or overdetermination - neither of which is attractive. The problem, however, is predicated on assumptions about psychophysical relations that dual-attribute theorists are not obliged to accept. I explore one way they can solve the problem by rejecting those assumptions.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9003-4

Affiliations: 1: Email: jaworski@fordham.edu

Publication date: 2006-09-01

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