Why the New Missing Explanation Argument Fails, Too

Author: Haukioja, Jussi¹

Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 64, Number 2, March 2006 , pp. 169-175(7)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The so-called missing explanation argument, put forward by Mark Johnston in the late 80's purported to show that our ordinary concepts of secondary qualities such as the colours cannot be response-dependent. A number of flaws were soon found in the argument. Partly in response to the criticism directed at the original argument, Johnston presented a new version in 1998. In this paper I show that the new version fails, too, for a simple reason: the kind of explanation which Johnston claims to be incompatible with a response-dependent account of the relevant concept is not an empirical explanation at all, but merely looks like one because of certain factors in Johnston's stage- setting for the argument.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-005-4309-1

Affiliations: 1: Email: jussi.haukioja@utu.fi, jhau@iki.fi

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