Why the New Missing Explanation Argument Fails, Too
Author: Haukioja, Jussi
Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 64, Number 2, March 2006 , pp. 169-175(7)
Abstract:The so-called missing explanation argument, put forward by Mark Johnston in the late 80’s purported to show that our ordinary concepts of secondary qualities such as the colours cannot be response-dependent. A number of flaws were soon found in the argument. Partly in response to the criticism directed at the original argument, Johnston presented a new version in 1998. In this paper I show that the new version fails, too, for a simple reason: the kind of explanation which Johnston claims to be incompatible with a response-dependent account of the relevant concept is not an empirical explanation at all, but merely looks like one because of certain factors in Johnston’s stage- setting for the argument.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Email: firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com
Publication date: March 2006