Author: Ritchie, Jack

Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 63, Number 1, July 2005 , pp. 119-132(14)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

Orthodox physicalism has a problem with mental causation. If physics is complete and mental events are not identical to physical events (as multiple-realisation arguments imply) it seems as though there is no causal work for the mental to do. This paper examines some recent attempts to overcome this problem by analysing causation in terms of counterfactuals or conditional probabilities. It is argued that these solutions cannot simultaneously capture the force of the completeness of physics and make room for mental causation.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-3056-7

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Newman Building, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland , Email: drjackritchie@yahoo.co.uk

Publication date: 2005-07-01

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