Breaking the Law of Desire
Author: Gert, Joshua
Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 62, Number 3, January 2005 , pp. 295-319(25)
Publisher: Springer
Abstract:
This paper offers one formal reason why it may often be inappropriate to hold, of two conflicting desires, that the first must be weaker than, stronger than, or of the same strength as the second. The explanation of this fact does not rely on vagueness or epistemological problems in determining the strengths of desires. Nor does it make use of the problematic notion of incommensurability. Rather, the suggestion is that the motivational capacities of many desires might best be characterized by two values, neither of which should be interpreted as strength.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-6881-1
Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, 151 Dodd Hall, Tallahassee, FL, 32306, U.S.A, Email: jgert@fsu.edu
Publication date: 2005-01-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Gert, Joshua

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