Externalism and Modest Contextualism

Author: Fred Dretske

Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 61, Numbers 2-3, November 2004 , pp. 173-186(14)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes a step farther and relativizes knowledge not just to the circumstances of the knower, but to the circumstances of the person attributing knowledge. I reject this more radical form of contextualism and suggest that it confuses (or that it can, at least, be avoided by carefully distinguishing) the relativity in what S is said to know from the relativity in whether S knows what S is said to know.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-9277-3

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Duke University, 201 West Duke Building, Durham, NC, 27708-0743, USA, Email: dretske@acpub.duke.edu

Publication date: 2004-11-01