Generalizing Qualia Inversion
Author: Campbell N.1
Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 60, Number 1, 200401 , pp. 27-34(8)
Publisher: Springer
Key:
- Free Content
- New Content
- Subscribed Content
- Free Trial Content
Abstract:
Philosophers who advocate the possibility of spectrum inversion often conclude that the qualitative content of experiential states pose a serious problem for functionalism. I argue that in order for the inversion hypothesis to support this conclusion one needs to show that it generalizes to all species of qualia. By examining features of touch, taste, and olfactory sensations, I show there is good reason to resist this generalization, in which case appeals to the possibility of spectral inversion are considerably less effective than they may initially appearDocument Type: Research article
Affiliations: 1: Wilfrid Laurier University Waterloo, Ontario Canada
Key:
- Free Content
- New Content
- Subscribed Content
- Free Trial Content

Click here for Page Help