Cartwright On Explanation And Idealization

Authors: Elgin M.¹; Sober E.²

Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 57, Number 3, 2002 , pp. 441-450(10)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Nancy Cartwright (1983, 1999) argues that (1) the fundamental laws of physics are true when and only when appropriate ceteris paribus modifiers are attached and that (2) ceteris paribus modifiers describe conditions that are almost never satisfied. She concludes that when the fundamental laws of physics are true, they don't apply in the real world, but only in highly idealized counterfactual situations. In this paper, we argue that (1) and (2) together with an assumption about contraposition entail the opposite conclusion – that the fundamental laws of physics do apply in the real world. Cartwright extracts from her thesis about the inapplicability of fundamental laws the conclusion that they cannot figure in covering-law explanations. We construct a different argument for a related conclusion – that forward-directed idealized dynamical laws cannot provide covering-law explanations that are causal. This argument is neutral on whether the assumption about contraposition is true. We then discuss Cartwright's simulacrum account of explanation, which seeks to describe how idealized laws can be explanatory.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of Philosophy 5185 Helen C. White Hall 600 North Park Street Madison, WI 53706 U.S.A. E-mail: melgin@students.wisc.edu 2: University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of Philosophy 5185 Helen C. White Hall 600 North Park Street Madison, WI 53706 U.S.A. E-mail: ersober@facstaff.wisc.edu

Publication date: 2002-01-01