Who's Afraid of Undermining?
Author: Vranas, P.B.M.
Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 57, Number 2, September 2002 , pp. 151-174(24)
Abstract:The Principal Principle (PP) says that, for any proposition A, given any admissible evidence and the proposition that the chance of A is x%, one's conditional credence in A should be x%. Humean Supervenience (HS) claims that, among possible worlds like ours, no two differ without differing in the spacetime-point-by-spacetime-point arrangement of local properties. David Lewis (1986b, 1994a) has argued that PP contradicts HS, and the validity of his argument has been endorsed by Bigelow et al. (1993), Thau (1994), Hall (1994), Strevens (1995), Ismael (1996), Hoefer (1997), and Black (1998). Against this consensus, I argue that PP might not contradict HS: Lewis's argument is invalid, and every attempt – within a broad class of attempts – to amend the argument fails.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Iowa State University Department of Philosophy 402 Catt Hall Ames IA 50011 U.S.A. E-mail: email@example.com://www.personal.iastate.edu/∼vranas/Homesite/index.htm
Publication date: 2002-09-01