Abstract:

This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledge that is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facieincompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that if one conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive of belief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the agent has knowledge of his beliefs. Accepting such a constitutive account of self-knowledge does not, however, preclude the conceptual possibility of being mistaken about one's mental states. Rather, self-knowledge has to be seen as only a general constraint or as the default assumption of interpreting somebody as a rational and intentional agent. This is compatible with the diagnosis of a localized lack of self-transparency.

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy College of the Holy Cross Worcester, MA 01610 U.S.A. E-mail: kstueber@holycross.edu